angelic moo

Republic Act No. 9282 expanded the jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals which now includes its exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal the decisions, orders or resolutions of the regional trial courts in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by the regional trial courts in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction. It is the CTA which has exclusive jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case. [1] [1] CE Casecnan Water and Energy Co. v. The Province of Nueva Ecija, G.R. No. 196278, June 17, 2015. In National Power Corporation v. Municipal Government of Navotas (G.R. No. 192300, November 24, 2014), and City of Lapu-Lapu v. Philippine Economic Zone Authority (G.R. No. 184203, November 26, 2014), the Supreme Court already held that local tax cases include real property tax.

The Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority is an instrumentality of the government; thus, its properties actually, solely and exclusively used for public purposes, consisting of the airport terminal building, airfield, runway, taxiway and the lots on which they are situated, are not subject to real property tax and respondent City is not justified in collecting taxes from petitioner over said properties. [1] MCIAA is vested with corporate powers but it is not a stock or non-stock corporation, which is a necessary condition before an agency or instrumentality is deemed a government-owned or controlled corporation. Like MIAA, petitioner MCIAA has capital under its charter but it is not divided into shares of stock. [2] [1] Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. City of Lapu-Lapu, et al. , G.R. No. 181756, June 15, 2015. [2] Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. City of Lapu-Lapu, et al. , G.R. No. 181756, June 15, 2015.

The Supreme Court declared section 14 of Republic Act No. 9167 as unconstitutional. It said that by earmarking the income on amusement taxes imposed by the local governments in favor of FDCP and the producers of graded films, the legislature appropriated and distributed local government funds (which are not legally within its control) under the guise of setting a limitation on the local governments’ exercise of their delegated taxing power. The Supreme Court held that this was a usurpation of the latter’s exclusive prerogative to apportion their funds, an impermissible intrusion into the local governments’ constitutionally-protected domain which negates the guarantee of fiscal autonomy to municipal corporations as mandated by the Constitution. [1] [1] Film Development Council of the Philippines v. Colon Heritage Realty Corporation ,   G.R. No. 203754/G.R. No. 204418, June 16, 2015 .

Two developments in Philippine law ended the debate on the contributions of  Oposa v. Factoran [1]  in environmental litigation. I have always been cynical about, and critical of  Oposa ; because I have yet to see what benefit the case brought to environmental protection. I will not repeat my attack on the case which has been published elsewhere. [2] I reiterate one criticism of  Oposa  that is relevant to my argument that this "novelty approach" to litigation that began in  Oposa  has been written off, probably unwittingly, by the Supreme Court. The argument I made years ago was that "Intergenerational equity as articulated in  Oposa  has no practical effect. If the children had invoked their own right to a balanced and healthful ecology, the Supreme Court would have decided the case in the same way. Neither the issues nor the Court’s interpretation of the law would change." [3] The Supreme Court proved that my argument is correct. The Court did this in two